How did our submarines participate in the larger naval battles during the Pacific War?

The following are the ways that U. S. submarines participated in or around some of the great naval battles in WW2 in the Pacific, including the Battles of Savo Island, Midway, the Philippine Sea and Leyre Gulf.

The Battle of Savo Island took place near the Solomons, early in the war, when we were still learning how to fight it. When the Japanese were withdrawing after one particularly damaging engagement for the U. S. surface fleet, the S-44 sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Kako.

Prior to the Battle of Midway, we had arranged a semi-circle of submarines to look for the Japanese fleet. Our code breakers had already determined that they were going to attack Midway, but we didn’t know exactly where they were coming from. The Japanese were very good at radio silence as they had demonstrated prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Nautilus found the attacking ships (or more accurately they found her.) Nautilus wasn’t able to attack but contributed indirectly.

The Japanese had located the USS Nautilus (SS-168) and left a destroyer behind to keep her down until the fleet was safely past. Our carrier aircraft were already in the air but were having difficulty finding the Japanese carriers. Fortunately, some of our planes spotted the destroyer and correctly guessed that it was racing to catch up with the main body. They turned in that direction and found the carriers. Luck was on our side since the Japanese planes were preoccupied with our torpedo bombers and because their admiral had his planes on deck being rearmed and refueled. Bomb hits on the Japanese carriers resulted in huge fires and secondary explosions. The result was a devastating victory for the U. S.

After the main battle, Nautilus found a battleship with escorts and fired two torpedoes. One misfired and the other missed. Later, Nautilus found one the Japanese carriers aflame. She fired four torpedoes at the carrier Kaga and heard explosions. Nautilus thought they had sunk the carrier but one torpedo had misfired, two missed and the fourth hit the target but didn’t explode.

NOTE: This could have been another early indication of problems with our torpedoes, specifically the Mark 14. However, we weren’t paying enough attention yet.

One submarine, the USS Grayling (SS-209), was attacked by U. S. B-17 bombers who thought they had sunk a Japanese cruiser in fifteen seconds. The Grayling had exchanged recognition signals with the aircraft. When the planes continued their attack, Grayling immediately crash-dived and escaped. This was after the main engagement.

NOTE: American submariners learned to never trust any airplane – ours or the Japanese. The standard procedure was always to dive when aircraft approached unless the plane was escorting the boat into port. It appears that, during the war, one or two American submarines were sunk by our pilots while in a “safe lane” where the pilot was not supposed to attack any vessel, whether American or Japanese.

In the early morning dark of the next day, the USS Tambor (SS-198) found a group of Japanese ships near Midway. She sent a contact report, thinking she had located the Japanese invasion force. However, the cruisers she spotted had only been sent to bombard Midway and would be recalled shortly. Unfortunately, the contact report led to confusion and allowed the main group to sail west for home with no further attacks. On a positive note, a Japanese lookout spotted Tambor and in the maneuvering to avoid Tambor, two cruisers collided and were significantly damaged. U. S. aircraft sank one of the cruisers soon after and further damaged the other.

In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, also known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot and the Invasion of Saipan, both the Americans and the Japanese expected that the invasion would trigger a major battle at sea. Japan was still looking for the major victory at sea that would regain control of the Western Pacific. Our submarines were deployed to locate the Japanese fleet and, hopefully, to inflict some damage on the fleet and to intercept their supply lines.

Well before the battle began, submarine warfare had reduced the fuel available to the Japanese fleet. Due to that shortage, Japanese pilots had limited training and air time. Because he had limited fuel at his disposal, Admiral Toyoda had to be sure of the American objectives before sailing and was slow to implement his defensive plan. The prior damage to tankers inflicted by submarines had already put the Japanese at a disadvantage.

USS Pampanito (SS-383) had been assigned lifeguard duty near Yap Island when our aircraft attacked the Japanese bases there. In preparation for the invasion of Saipan, we wanted to put those nearby airfields out of commission.

In preparation for the invasion, submarines were assigned to clear the area near Saipan of Japanese supply ships. Some examples are:

1. The USS Tang (SS-306) spotted a supply convoy of five vessels in the vicinity of the Marianas and sank two of them. A day or two later the boat sank three more supply ships.
2. The USS Sunfish (SS-281) sank two other cargo ships.
3. The USS Trout (SS-202) found a convoy bringing three regiments of Japanese troops to the Marianas. Trout sank one ship and damaged another. Of the 4,000 reinforcements troops, only 1,720 made it ashore and a third of those went straight to a hospital.
4. As part of a wolfpack, USS Pintado (SS-387) and USS Shark (SS-174) sank three large cargo ships with terrible losses to the embarked soldiers.

Intelligence about the location and progress of the Japanese fleet was provided by:

1. The USS Redfin (SS-272) spotted the Japanese fleet with its six carriers plus battleships and cruisers as they departed Tawi Tawi headed for Saipan.
2. The USS Harder had also reported three battleships in the same area, including one of the super battleships of the Musashi class.
3. The USS Flying Fish (SS-229) reported three carriers and battleships as they exited the San Bernardino Straight in the Philippines.
4. The USS Seahorse (SS-304) reported four warships and six other ships east of Surigao Straight, near the Philippines.
5. The USS Cavalla (SS-244), relieving Seahorse, reported three tankers but couldn’t get close enough to attack. This provided enough information for Admiral Spruance to get a clear picture of Japanese intentions. It also helped Admiral Lockwood deploy his submarines in the area. Cavalla was then able to reestablish contact and make another report.

Two Japanese carriers were sunk by submarines during the battle:

1. Shortly after the Japanese had launched aircraft against the American carriers, USS Albacore (SS-218) managed to hit the Japanese carrier IJN Taiho with a single torpedo. Although this would not normally be a fatal blow, the Albacore got some help from the Japanese damage control parties. Hours later, the Taiho was opened up internally in order to ventilate smoke and gasoline vapors. Instead, the gasoline fumes ignited and the resulting explosions wrecked and sank the carrier.
2. A few hours later, Cavalla found the carrier IJN Shokaku and fired six torpedoes at her. Three of them hit the Japanese carrier and set off secondary explosions among the torpedo planes being fueled on the hangar deck. Shokaku actually sank about thirty minutes before Taiho. These were two of the largest and best carriers that the Japanese had remaining.

In the battle of the Philippine Sea, the Japanese lost a total of three carriers and over 400 aircraft. As at Midway, they again lost most of their seasoned pilots. The Japanese would never again be able to send an effective carrier task force to sea.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was intended by the Japanese to be a gun battle. The plan was to divide the Japanese forces into three groups. The Central and Southern Forces were to break through the American forces and destroy the landing fleet taking back the Philippines. The Northern Force was a carrier group decoy to draw the American carriers away from the landing fleet.

The submarines USS Darter (SS-227) and USS Dace (SS-247) reported contacts with three cruisers, possibly of the Central Force. At the time, they were not able to get into position to attack. Very early the next day, they rendezvoused to discuss plans when they were interrupted by a radar contact. This was a much larger group of contacts which turned out to be the very large Central group. The submarines reported the new intelligence information. They then set a trap and sank the heavy cruisers IJN Atago and IJN Maya and seriously damaged the heavy cruiser IJN Takao.

The USS Bream (SS-243) was credited with damage to the heavy cruiser IJN Aoba, which had been detached from the Central Force as a troop movement detachment. USS Angler (SS-240) and USS Guitarro (SS-363) were able to report the movement of the Central Force and confirm that it was headed to the San Bernardardino Straight. After this, there was no further involvement of our submarines with the Southern or Central Forces.

The Northern group did attract Admiral Halsey with his large carriers and fast battleships as the Japanese had hoped. After the U. S. carrier pilots engaged the Japanese ships, our submarines in the area were free to engage with any targets they could find. The USS Halibut (SS-232) found what was thought to be a battleship. The captain fired six torpedoes and believed he had five hits. He later observed what he believed to be a capsized hull and two escorts picking up survivors. However, he was not credited with the sinking.

The USS Haddock (SS-231) observed gun flashes and star shells from a surface engagement by our cruisers. Captain Roach “decided not to get into this melee until our forces quit, then try to catch them (Japanese ships) on the way home.” Unfortunately, by then the targets were out of range.

The USS Jalleo (SS-368) picked up two targets on radar and fired four torpedoes at a cruiser from close range. He saw three hits accompanied by bright flashes. When he surfaced 30 minutes later, there was nothing in sight. That was because the target, the IJN Tama, had sunk in plain sight of the USS Pintado (SS-387).